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Introduction 
 
 
 
The diagnostic process in polygraph testing involves a comparison between the 
intensity of the response registered to one type of question – so-called relevant 
questions – with the intensity of response registered to another type of question, 
such as control questions, probable lie questions, neutral questions, etc., depending 
of the technique employed. 
 
 
It may be shown that this situation is typical for scientific evidence construed as an 
assessment of comparison. To this end, consider the following (Aitken, Taroni, 
2004): 
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The interpretation of scientific evidence may be thought of as the assessment 
of a comparison. This comparison is that between evidential material found 
at the scene of a crime (denote by Mc) and evidential material found on  
a suspect, a suspect clothing or around his environment (denote this by Ms). 
Denote the combination by M = (Mc, Ms). (…) Qualities (…) or measure-
ments (…) are taken from M. Comparisons are made of the source form and 
the receptor form Denote these by Ec and Es, respectively, and let E = (Ec, 
Es) denote the combined set. Comparison of Ec and Es is to be made and the 
assessment of this comparison has to be quantified. The totality of the evi-
dence is denoted by E and is such that Ev = (M, E). 
 
In the case of polygraph examination, material Mc is created within the psyche of 
the individual who has perpetrated an act, while material Ms exists in the psyche of 
each individual. “Qualities” are constituted from the aforementioned types of ques-
tions and responses to the questions, whereas “measurements” are the intensities of 
the responses. In the case of relevant questions, we obtain Ec, and other questions 
Es. Evidence from polygraph testing Ev,, i.e. Ev = (M, E) comprises: the questions 
used in the examination and the intensity of the responses registered after these 
questions. To reiterate from Aitken and Taroni: „Comparison of Ec and Es is to be 
made and the assessment of this comparison has to be quantified”.  
 
While the foregoing observations seem to be fully in accordance with elementary 
intuition concerning polygraph testing, they are worth restating, since Aitken and 
Taroni’s comments are relevant to the evaluation of evidence in forensic science in 
general, while to date the interpretation of polygraph examinations have remained 
outside the mainstream of forensic science. This does not benefit the discipline. 
 
 
 
Problem 
 
 
 
Let us consider the following:  
 
(1) Xi Є (DI) 
 
where DI denotes the quality of deception indicated, (DI) denotes the set of indi-
viduals designated by this quality, and Xi denotes a specific individual. Let us as-
sume that (1) was formulated as a result of a polygraph examination. The meaning 
of (1) is naturally such that the individual Xi was diagnosed as deceptive. Accept-
ing (1) leads to acceptance of further statements, such as: (a) Xi was presented with 
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the suggestion of undergoing an examination, (b) Xi agreed to undergo the exami-
nation, (c) the examiner conducted the test, (d) the examiner interpreted the charts 
generated during the examination and drew a conclusion, and (e) the examiner is 
convinced that (1) is true. 
 
Note that analogous comments concern the statement:  
 
(2) Xj Є (NDI) 
 
General, investigative and juridical expertise, as well as elementary knowledge of 
scientific methods lead to the conclusion that not all statements of the nature of (1) 
and (2) are true, despite the examiners’ conviction. Stated briefly, some conclu-
sions drawn from examinations are false, and the question of what is the proportion 
of true to false conclusions is as old as polygraph testing itself. A massive body of 
literature is devoted to this issue and it is not the purpose of this paper to cite or 
analyse it. Those interested may find it useful to review current literature, such as 
for example The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003). 
 
Therefore, in a sense, an element of uncertainty is present in the results of any ex-
amination. For convenience sake, and at the risk of oversimplifying the matter, let 
us assume that a statement of the following nature would be more realistic than (1) 
and (2):  
 
(3) Xi probably Є (DI) 
(4) Xj probably Є (NDI) 
 
the sense of which is that Xi was as a result of the examination diagnosed as an 
individual who is probably deceptive, and Xj as probably truthful.  
 
The aim of this paper then is to analyse selected aspects of uncertainty in poly-
graph testing.  
 
 
 
Selected sources of uncertainty in the diagnostics process  
 
 
 
Three methods of interpreting test results are used: the visual method (global, 
qualitative), the numerical method, and the computer method.  
 
The first method is considered the weakest and most subjective, since it is based on 
a general impression, the strength and consistency of the responses registered and 
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on informal evaluations of facts, examinee utterances and his/her attitude during 
the test. The accuracy of diagnostic decisions made using the global method is 
significantly lower than those made using the numerical method (Kirchner, Raskin, 
2003). 
 
In the global method, practically all of the elements involved in the interpretation 
may constitute a source of uncertainty, given the ambiguity of the terms employed 
in their description, such as the aforementioned “general impression,” “strength 
and consistency,” “evaluation of facts,” “subject’s attitude,” etc.  
 
Numerical methods, although definitely constituting major progress in the diagnos-
tic procedures, are not flawless either, as indicated in the term by which some au-
thors to refer to them: “semi-objective”. Some approaches suggested for use in 
numerical methods are highly precise. The 7-position scale adopted by the De-
partment of Defence Polygraph Institute (Swinford, 1999) is an instance of such 
precision. Even such solutions, however, are not – because they cannot be – free 
from ambiguous expressions, such as: “…the most common physiological response 
(…) is an increase (…) from the baseline level – usually beginning at or near 
stimulus onset and lasting for a few seconds …” (Swinford, 1999; own emphasis). 
This is not in criticism of Swinford, because in the description of individual and 
unique psycho-physiological phenomena such expressions are inevitable. 
 
Other ambiguities appear as well in connection with the numerical method, some-
times of a very basic nature. Matte (1996), in presenting a chart of the distribution 
of points for the examinations of “guilty” and “innocent” individuals, does not 
include the legend for the vertical axis, inaccurately indicates the mean (which 
should be marked with a point on the horizontal axis and not a vertical section), 
calculates for unknown reasons the mean and standard deviation up to 4 decimal 
places while the scoring chart based on whole integers, and does not indicate 
whether the chart is asymptotic towards the horizontal axis. Also, the priory as-
sumption of threshold values of +3 and -5 (although probably empirically justified) 
is another source of uncertainty.  
 
The probabilistic nature of polygraph examination is even more visible when com-
puter methods are employed in diagnostics. In their extensive analysis of this sub-
ject matter, Kirchner and Raskin (2003) explicitly use type (3) and (4) sentences. 
At the same time, it seems unquestionable that automated computer systems of 
diagnosis have an advantage over other methods; current research shows this even 
in relation to the relevant-irrelevant test, which is often considered rather outdated 
(Honts, Amato, 2007). Thus, although it is still admissible to use various methods 
of diagnostics (for instance, the APA Standards of Practice advice in section 
3.10.1: “Examiners’ conclusions and opinions are required to be based on quantita-
tive or numerical scoring…”. Analogously, the Standard Practices for Interpreta-
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tion of Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (Polygraph) Data, ASTM In-
ternational, Designation: E2229 – 02, indicates only “global evaluation” in section 
4.1 and “numerical evaluation” in section 4.2). The dominance of automated com-
puter algorithms is imminent.  
 
Naturally, however, it may not be conceded that scoring methods are the only 
source of uncertainty in polygraph examinations. Yet, the foregoing brief reminder 
will suffice for the following discussion.  
 
 
 
Uncertainty and notions of probability  
 
 
 
When the qualitative method of evaluation of the polygraph examination is used, 
the examiner’s uncertainty is expressed in terms of subjective probability, also 
known as psychological probability. The premise for using this notion of probabil-
ity is the high level of difficulty in computing calculations using notions of fre-
quency, and in particular, of combinations thereof; in fact, it is practically impossi-
ble to do so. The likelihood contained in the diagnosis (for instance, Xi probably Є 
(DI), Xj very probably Є (NDI)…) is a measure of the examiner’s conviction, who 
– using his/her common sense and experience – overcomes (or rather bypasses) the 
calculation problems. While in many cases there is nothing inappropriate in it, 
stepping beyond the traditional trio of outcomes (DI, NDI, inconclusive) may be 
useful. This is so because using an expression of the expert’s conviction on a scale 
enables an attempt to include a kind of sum of observations resulting from the sub-
ject’s behaviour, subject’s attempts to employ countermeasures to affect examina-
tion outcomes, and the combination of results of various tests (e.g., control ques-
tion tests and peak of tension tests), etc. The term “probably” may also mean that 
the expert, using a specific diagnostic algorithm, did not find in the available mate-
rial complete grounds that he/she requires, but sufficient information that he/she 
considers to be important, and states that “Xi is rather DI than NDI”, or “more ar-
guments exist to consider Xi as DI than otherwise”. It is important to note here that 
instead of using such expressions, the use of the “examination of Xi jest inconclu-
sive” formula may lead to a loss of important information. 
 
Polygraph examiners in Poland often use this manner of expressing uncertainty. 
One must bear in mind, however, that using subjective probability necessitates 
taking into account the fact that the assessment of its value may vary considerably 
depending on the person who undertakes the assessment, which is a major weak-
ness of this approach.  
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Kirchner and Raskin (2003) analysed frequency probability using Bayes’ Theorem 
in the context of the numerical method (7-position scale) and using computer tech-
niques. Their comments are worth quoting: 
 
Numerical evaluators use cutoffs of +/-6 to classify polygraph outcomes as 
truthful, deceptive or inconclusive. A score of +6 or greater is considered  
a truthful outcome, a score of -6 or less is a deceptive outcome, and scores 
between the cutoffs are inconclusive. In contrast to the categorical decisions 
by the polygraph examiner, the probabilities output by the computer are con-
tinuous. (…) Our research suggests that the optimal cutoffs are .70 and .30 
for truthful and deceptive decisions respectively. They are optimal in the 
sense that they produce relatively few inconclusive outcomes and relatively 
high accuracy rates. 
 
It is clear therefore that computer techniques make it possible to attain a scientific 
standard of uncertainty, i.e. a way of expressing it in terms of frequency probabil-
ity. It seems, however, that an approach in terms of significance probability is also 
possible. 
 
 
 
Significance probability approach 
 
 
 
The basic operation enabling the use of statistical induction in diagnosing the re-
sults of a single examination is the automation of ranking of the intensity of re-
sponses to test questions. Response ranking surfaced in the research on numerical 
evaluation of records and have been described in detail (Honts, Driscoll, 1988; 
Miritello, 1999). Without going into technical details, it is worth noting that pro-
ducing a ranking using a computer algorithm is very simple and may be performed 
automatically immediately upon completion of the examination.  
 
Let us assume that the subject Xm was examined using a test including Nc relevant 
questions and Ns other questions (control questions, probable lie questions, neutral 
questions), where Nc, Ns ≥ 4 (if the test included buffer questions, they should be 
disregarded in the calculation). The diagnosis, i.e. the decision to find the subject 
Xm among either the (DI) set or the (NDI) set involves a comparison of intensities 
of responses to Nc and Ns questions. If the distribution of response intensities for 
responses from both sets appear to be “similar” or if the intensity of responses to 
Ns questions higher, this constitutes grounds for including Xm in the (NDI) set; if 
the intensities are higher for the responses to Nc questions, Xm will be placed in the 
(DI) set. The decision may be taken on either a global or a numerical basis. It is 
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also possible, however, to assume a null hypothesis that the intensities of responses 
to questions from both groups come from a population of identical response inten-
sities. Thus, the following null hypothesis:  
 
H0: intensities of reactions after Nc and Ns questions may be treated as coming 
from a joint general population.  
 
Once an automated joint ranking of response intensities for questions from one test 
is compiled (e.g., RIT, CQT, PLT…) it becomes clear that in order to test the null 
hypothesis, a non-parametric statistical tool for an ordinal scale must be used. The 
Wilcoxon rank sum test is a classical tool of this kind and it is considered to be  
a very good alternative to the t test (Ferguson, Takane, 1989). If these do not pro-
duce grounds for rejecting the null hypothesis, the subject may be found (NDI), 
while rejecting the null hypothesis indicates either an (NDI) or a (DI) result de-
pending on the value of the sum of the ranks in both groups of questions.  
 
By designating the responses to relevant questions as Ec, and to other questions as 
Es, we can see that the aforementioned Aitken and Taroni requirement is satisfied, 
since this procedure makes it possible (in an objective manner, assuming that the 
ranking algorithm is correct) to achieve a quantitatively comparative assessment of 
Ec and Es. 
 
While the procedure outlined above appears formally correct, it nonetheless raises 
a number of fundamental questions. First, is it permitted to count neutral questions, 
control questions, probable lie questions, etc., to one sample? Second, should  
a directional or a non-directional test be employed to test the null hypothesis? 
Third, what criteria should be used to assume a particular significance level in test-
ing the null hypothesis? Fourth, what rules should be adopted to reach a conclusion 
on the basis of a number of invariant tests (for instance, mixed question test, si-
lence answer test, yes test) in a single polygraph examination? This is not an ex-
haustive list of the issues.  
 
One may venture a guess that the answer to the first question is “yes”. As for the 
second and third questions, the answers will depend on the acceptable proportion 
of type one and type two errors and on the expected restrictiveness of the tests. The 
fourth and most difficult question might be answered if consideration is given to 
the possibility of employing a correlation coefficient or an ANOVA-type test for 
an ordinal scale (such as the Kruskal-Wallis test, which, however, would require  
a continuous ordering of Ec and Es during the entire examination), or to other, dif-
ferent statistical tools. There are no doubts that only experimental research will 
bring answers to these (and other) questions within reach. Such research is cur-
rently underway.  
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The utility of a probable opinion  
 
The ultimate goal of a polygraph examination is to supply a premise (in the form of 
scientific proof) in a logical argument aimed at reaching a legal decision. In fact, 
scientific proof is not “independent” in the sense that an expert’s opinion is based 
not only on the observations from the examination but also on certain theoretical 
grounds. This theoretical background is referred to in this context as indirectly 
relevant evidence, ancillary evidence, or auxiliary evidence. Its role in the con-
struction of the framework of proof is outlined below, using David Schum’s con-
cept (Schum, 2000) and adopting his approach to the circumstances of polygraph 
examination.  
 
Let us assume that subject Xi, is suspected of having perpetrated an act, has under-
gone a polygraph examination, as has consequently been designated as (DI). Does 
this statement, i.e. Xi Є (DI) allow us to conclude that Xi is, in careful terms, asso-
ciated with the act? Schum claims that it does, provided that we are in possession 
of a generalisation that supports or licenses such reasoning. Such a generalisation 
might in this case assume the following form: “Whenever something like the opin-
ion “Xi Є (DI)” (event A) happens, then something like “Xi is associated with the 
offence” (event B) probably happens”. It is not surprising that the author immedi-
ately adds: “There is never any guarantee that an asserted generalisation does apply 
in a particular instance. How strongly ancillary evidence supports generalisation 
(...) also bears upon the strength of the probabilistic linkage between events...” 
(Schum, 2000).  
 
This “strength of the probabilistic linkage” constitutes at the same time a measure 
of uncertainty of the examination results. If the global or semi-numerical methods 
were used to interpret the charts, the estimate of the degree of uncertainty of the 
generalisation, and consequently of the examination as scientific proof, will remain 
qualitative.  
 
A qualitative estimate of the level of certainty/uncertainty of the polygraph exami-
nation does not of course preclude its usefulness, particularly as a basis for action. 
The estimate of “very likely” may correspond with the legal standard of “clear and 
convincing evidence”, “likely” – “clear showing”, “medium likelihood” – “pre-
ponderance of the evidence”, etc., as suggested by C. Weiss (2003). Weiss, how-
ever, admits that – as any subjective scale – such scales are only capable of ex-
pressing the subjective belief as to the degree of uncertainty in a given situation.  
 
The presence of the subjective element in the interpretation of polygraph examina-
tion has one more aspect that should be counted among extra-legal factors and 
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placed in the sphere of cultural context. Namely, one may not disregard the fact 
that there are individuals and whole communities – and not just in the legal profes-
sion – who object to the use of the polygraph, for example on moral grounds. It is 
worth remembering that in the post-Soviet countries for example public opinion 
was for decades indoctrinated against “lie-detection”, presented as an abomination 
of American capitalism; traces of such attitudes are still evident today, despite 
advances in research. M. Damaška (2003) pointed out such phenomena connected 
with the changes in fact-finding technology. It appears that the subjectivity present 
in the interpretation of polygraph examinations is conducive to such attacks against 
the method.  
 
Conversely, attaining standards for quantitative estimation of uncertainty, which is 
increasingly common for identification methods in forensic sciences, will work to 
the advantage of polygraph testing in terms of social attitudes, particularly among 
practising lawyers.  
 
Finally, let us consider the argument that is perhaps the most important one in fa-
vour of reducing subjectivity as the generator of uncertainty in polygraph testing. 
Namely, this subjectivity factor may become a reason for a generally negative 
evaluation of polygraph expertise. In the European discussion – which is of such 
great importance today – of the quality of forensic expertise such a comment was 
made: “A final notable aspect of forensic science is that many forensic science 
techniques call for large degrees of subjective judgement. (...) This is not a criti-
cism of those techniques, but we should note that an implication of it is that, where 
techniques rely on subjective judgement rather than articulable and testable princi-
ples, they require careful empirical validation in order to substantiate  their propo-
nents’ claims” (Redmayne, 2000). 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
Bringing the methodology of polygraph examination closer to the quality standards 
of other areas of forensic science definitely seems useful. Diagnoses of “Deception 
Indicated”, “No Deception Indicated”, and “Inconclusive” are becoming obsolete, 
finding declining support in methodology and, more importantly, do not account 
well for uncertainty. The introduction and spread of computer methods creates 
myriad new possibilities to use inferential statistics and this direction of research 
into interpreting the results of polygraph examinations seems to be the most prom-
ising.  
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